Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin.
Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.
Attack Parameters
Impact Assessment
CVSS Vector v4.0