Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess.
Attack Parameters
Attack Vector
Network
Can be exploited remotely
Attack Complexity
Low
Easy to exploit
Privileges Required
None
No privileges needed
User Interaction
None
No user interaction needed
Impact Assessment
Confidentiality
None
No data leak
Integrity
High
Complete data modification
Availability
None
No disruption
CVSS Vector v3.1
Weakness Type (CWE)
Vulnerable Products 1
| Configuration | From (including) | Up to (excluding) |
|---|---|---|
|
Gitea Gitea
cpe:2.3:a:gitea:gitea:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
— |
28.0.0
|
References 4
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-p3pc-g8m5-hrrr
GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-p3pc-g8m5-hrrr
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426
Fix: go-gitea/gitea pull request #39426
https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0/
Gitea 28.0.0 release announcement
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0
go-gitea/gitea v28.0.0 release