In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK
tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count
from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it
does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK
message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction
wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true
and starving the connection of further transmits. Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the
message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding.
A peer (or,
for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a
TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack.
Attack Parameters
Impact Assessment
CVSS Vector v3.1