Heym before 0.0.98 fails to apply SSRF egress guards to WebSocket Send and WebSocket Trigger nodes, allowing authenticated users to connect to internal services. Attackers can craft workflow nodes with arbitrary URLs and headers to reach internal services and read responses from the WebSocket Trigger node.
Attack Parameters
Attack Vector
Network
Can be exploited remotely
Attack Complexity
Low
Easy to exploit
Attack Requirements
None
No additional conditions
Privileges Required
Low
Basic privileges needed
User Interaction
None
No user interaction needed
Impact Assessment
Confidentiality
Low
Partial data leak
Integrity
Low
Partial data modification
Availability
None
No disruption
CVSS Vector v4.0
Weakness Type (CWE)
References 7
https://github.com/heymrun/heym
disclosure@vulncheck.com
https://github.com/heymrun/heym/blob/v0.0.97/backend/app/services/websocket_tri…
disclosure@vulncheck.com
https://github.com/heymrun/heym/blob/v0.0.97/backend/app/services/websocket_uti…
disclosure@vulncheck.com
https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/540aade7c7495295062f32f4dfd0d6805f066f0c
disclosure@vulncheck.com
https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/v0.0.98
disclosure@vulncheck.com
https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-mqw6-g845-w596
disclosure@vulncheck.com
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.98-ssrf-via-websocket-endp…
disclosure@vulncheck.com