Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.2, registry/client.(*manifests).Get() reads a manifest returned for a digest-pinned request and passes it to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without hashing the body against the requested digest, allowing a malicious or intercepted registry response to substitute attacker-chosen manifest content even when Docker-Content-Digest claims the requested value. The bundled pull-through proxy in registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go can cache and re-serve the substituted manifest.
This issue is fixed in version 3.1.2.
Attack Parameters
Attack Vector
Network
Can be exploited remotely
Attack Complexity
High
Difficult to exploit
Privileges Required
None
No privileges needed
User Interaction
None
No user interaction needed
Impact Assessment
Confidentiality
None
No data leak
Integrity
High
Complete data modification
Availability
None
No disruption
CVSS Vector v3.1
Weakness Type (CWE)
References 3
https://github.com/distribution/distribution/commit/960439b09f342cdeb8f1c0e18e8…
security-advisories@github.com
https://github.com/distribution/distribution/releases/tag/v3.1.2
security-advisories@github.com
https://github.com/distribution/distribution/security/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j…
security-advisories@github.com