In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: caiaq: validate EP1 reply lengths
usb_ep1_command_reply_dispatch() uses buf[0] as a command byte and then
reads command-specific fixed items from the same URB buffer. Several
paths use buf + 1, buf[1], buf[2], or buf + 3 without first proving that
urb->actual_length contains those bytes.
Add per-command length checks, use a payload length derived from the
bytes after the command byte for the control-state copy, and reject short
analog input payloads before the input helper reads fixed offsets from
the EP1 reply.
References 3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74f3c639f64fa5da4e1613149798b5089bce2807
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aba30af07d4fe499b50209801eba9da8a815522f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af8a172c4f71ac30d625f2966d2389a7fa872819
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67