The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.
Attack Parameters
Attack Vector
Network
Can be exploited remotely
Attack Complexity
High
Difficult to exploit
Privileges Required
High
Admin privileges needed
User Interaction
None
No user interaction needed
Impact Assessment
Confidentiality
High
Complete data leak
Integrity
High
Complete data modification
Availability
None
No disruption
CVSS Vector v3.1
Weakness Type (CWE)
References 4
https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace
reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/commit/690dcfd694
reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/releases/tag/updater-v2.12.0
reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/security/advisories/GHSA-j38x-g…
reefs@jfrog.com