Enclave OS Virtual runs container workloads inside confidential virtual machines with end-to-end attestation. Prior to tdx-v0.2.43 and tdx-gpu-v0.6.27, the TDX/GPU RA-TLS certificate issuer placed the certificate public-key hash and client nonce in quote ReportData but omitted a value bound to the active TLS session. An attacker who obtained an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine quote onto another connection, causing a relying party to accept an attacker-terminated connection as the attested enclave.
This issue is fixed in tdx-v0.2.43 and tdx-gpu-v0.6.27.
Attack Parameters
Attack Vector
Network
Can be exploited remotely
Attack Complexity
High
Difficult to exploit
Attack Requirements
Present
Additional conditions required
Privileges Required
None
No privileges needed
User Interaction
None
No user interaction needed
Impact Assessment
Confidentiality
High
Complete data leak
Integrity
High
Complete data modification
Availability
None
No disruption
CVSS Vector v4.0
Weakness Type (CWE)
Vulnerable Products
privasys:enclave-os-virtual
References 5
https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/commit/9a6be91e29f2b6738d0b77c33…
security-advisories@github.com
https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/releases/tag/tdx-gpu-v0.6.27
security-advisories@github.com
https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/releases/tag/tdx-v0.2.43
security-advisories@github.com
https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/security/advisories/GHSA-p5fp-g9…
security-advisories@github.com
https://privasys.org/blog/binding-attestation-to-the-tls-session
security-advisories@github.com