Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester.
The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.
Attack Parameters
Attack Vector
Network
Can be exploited remotely
Attack Complexity
High
Difficult to exploit
Attack Requirements
Present
Additional conditions required
Privileges Required
None
No privileges needed
User Interaction
None
No user interaction needed
Impact Assessment
Confidentiality
High
Complete data leak
Integrity
High
Complete data modification
Availability
None
No disruption
CVSS Vector v4.0
Weakness Type (CWE)
Vulnerable Products
privasys:ra-tls-clients
References 3
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/security/advisories/GHSA-pj2x-5wqv-f…
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/security/advisories/GHSA-pj2x-5wqv-fh57
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/1179ed097fdcb8519a85973a8a6c6…
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/1179ed097fdcb8519a85973a8a6c6ccbd0f50b03
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/releases/tag/v0.11.0
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/releases/tag/v0.11.0