In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: use the DMA API for resource backing on Xen
On a Xen PV domain page addresses bear no relation to the real machine
addresses the host would have to use to reach it.
virtio_ring.c handles this correctly, vring_use_map_api() returns true
for any xen_domain() regardless of VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
virtio-gpu makes the same decision independently, but its copy
looks only at the feature bit:
bool use_dma_api = !virtio_has_dma_quirk(vgdev->vdev);
QEMU does not set iommu_platform on virtio-vga by default, so
VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is not negotiated, use_dma_api is false, and
virtio_gpu_object_shmem_init() describes the framebuffer's backing pages
to the host with sg_phys(). Those are guest-physical addresses. In a PV
domain they resolve, on the host side, to pages belonging to some other
domain, so the host scans out unrelated memory.
Move the decision into virtio_gpu_use_dma_api() and give it the
xen_domain() check, like vring_use_map_api() has. This
additionally enables the dma_sync_sgtable_for_device() calls in
virtgpu_vq.c, which are required for correctness whenever swiotlb
is in play. Reproduced with a Xen 4.21 PV dom0 nested inside QEMU 8.2 with
virtio-vga, on both a distro 6.8 kernel and 6.18 LTS.
A PVH dom0
works fine and doesn't need this fix because it is identity-mapped,
only PV dom0s are affected.